to work for 'nasrat al-'Irdq'.' I n contrast, the communists condemned Kaylhi's rebellion for its alleged Nazi character.2 Active co-operation between Ba'thism and communism was resumed only in the 1950s, and then for very different reasons and under vastly changed circumstances. In the meantime the leading members of al-Ihyd' al-'Arabi polished their political doctrines, but in a casual manner. Not until 1946 at a meeting in the Lona Park cafk did they officially agree to establish the Arab Resurrection Party (Hizb al-Ba'tJ al-'Arabi) with its own daily, al-Ba'th.3 A year later a B a ' a congress assembled in Damascus; internal organization for the party was blueprinted, and a somewhat detailed constitution adopted.4
It is not fundamental to the purpose of this essay to dwell on the ideology of the Ba'a,s but there is need to emphasize the party's raison d'6tl.e. From its obscure beginnings, the movement was above everything else dedicated to the overriding objective of effecting a structural transformation, or Inqildb, in the spirit and thinking of the Arab people which would revolutionize their society. This was to be achieved through relentless struggle against reactionary elements with vested interests in the anachronisms of the status quo, and other political groupings who were considered to only feign nationalism while being in reality opposed to the national welfare. 'Aflaq laid down three essential conditions for the Inqildb :
(I) Awareness of the historical and contemporary realities which called for drastic transformation; (2) a feeling of responsibility rooted in a strong moral base; and (3) a genuine belief in the feasibility, at the existing stage of Arab history, of the proposed Inqildb.6 These conditions were to be fulfilled by al-TaM'a (the vanguard) who constituted the membership of the Ba'lh. 'The struggle which I designated as the practical expression of the Inqildb', wrote 'Aflaq, 'creates its own crusaders. The Inqildb becomes a living thing in their souls, minds and manners or it becomes life itself'.7 Once achieved, the Inqildb would presumably usher in the Ba'fhist trinity-unity, freedom, and socialism.
Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: a Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945 -1958 (London, 1965 Salgma, Al-Ba'th, p. 6. Kamil Abu Jaber, on the other hand, mentions that the Ba'th party was established in 1943. See The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party History, Ideology and Organization (Syracuse, 19661, P. 23 . 4 However, the present internal organization of the party was not instituted until 1957. Al-Jundi, p. 33 . A good discussion of the party's organization and structure appears in Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba 'th, pp. 139-45. 5 Aside from 'Aflaq's works and the constitution of the Ba'th, translated from Arabic in 1957 by the department of PSPA, American University of Beirut, the party's ideology is canvassed in Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba 'th, pp. 97-138 See also Gordon H. Torrey, 'The Ba'tb-ideology and practice', Middle East Journal, vol. XXIII (1969), pp. 445-54. Conversely, the trinity are indispensable ingredients for the success of the Inqildb, since the ideals of unity, freedom and socialism are considered fundamental and inseparable objectives of equal importance.1
Central to 'Aflaq's thinking is the quest for freedom, conceived not merely as emancipation from political tyranny and oppressive poverty, but the liberation of the Arab people, unified in mind and spirit, joined together in social brotherhood. Freedom should, therefore, emanate from the very soul of the Arab and be cherished as an indivisible part of his cultural heritage. Here again the path to freedom is that of struggle strewn with sacrifice.2 Since such a generic conception of freedom could not be achieved or even promoted without state action, especially in the education of the masses, the political machinery of the state had to be freed from the grip of the privileged classes, considered to be custodians of the feudal past, and intrinsically opposed to the idea of the Inqildb. For that purpose 'Aflaq and his supporters advocated the prompt implementation of a radical program of socialism designed to eradicate the economic power, and hence political domination, of the big landowners, business and commercial magnates, and give the people a stronger sense of belonging to society through direct ownership of land and plant.3
Every action based on principle was to be geared, in the final analysis, towards unification of the Arab world-the paramount objective of the Ba'&. Without unity the Arabs could not possibly recapture their former glory and become once again creative agents in human civilization. Ba'hism, however, disparages any unity that is achieved by military force or through agreement among political leaders regardless of their intentions. True unity can only be 'the result of a spiritual Inqildb in Arab society and . . . is a factor in the Inqildbl.4 Only then would the Arab people in separate political regions realize that they constitute one nation.
Most of the ideas enunciated by the B a ' a were neither new nor exclusive. The need for a metamorphic change in Arab society had long been propounded by intellectuals and reformers. Principles of social justice (al-'Addla al-ijtimd'iyya), if not socialism, were already a popular theme in the Arab world after 1945 owing to the enhanced stature of the Soviet Union, the triumph of the British Labour Party, and the espousal of welfare economics in the United States.5 And the B a ' h could hardly be considered the inventor of Arab unity. But the dynamic presentation of unity, and the addition of freedom and socialism as an organic concept based on the theory of the Inqildb, was excitingly new and Michel 'Aflaq, M'arakat al-Masir al-Whhid (Beirut, 1963) very relevant to the Syria of the 1940s. Here at long last was a genuine pan-Arab party endowed with a sound ideology and efficient organization responding to, and representing, the visionary dreams of nationalist youth.' It was the timeliness of the Ba'& perhaps more than its ideology and structure that gave it potential for success. If it failed to make political headway immediately after its formation, it was because the party had its fair share of intellectualism and pseudo-intellectualism, but virtually none of the required political realism. Originating from and built around, the high school and the university, the teacher and the student, the Ba'th was at first far removed from the people it sought to enlighten and liberate. Its ideology was too sophisticated for the peasants and the workers; its leadership was separated from the masses by the painful reality of class differe n c e~.T his was especially true because the Ba'th to a large measure bore the impress of its founder-philosopher, Michel 'Aflaq. Sensitive and austere, 'Aflaq is more of a talented intellectual than a political leader. A poor public speaker, he is at his best amidst a small circle of followers discussing ideology. There is much of the suspicious, nervous artist in his conduct. Credulous and even vain, he is vulnerable to praise and duplicity. When ill-advised he makes grave mistakes, for he has 'the innocence of childhood and the caution of old age'. His is a personality of contradiction complicated by a strange mixture of weakness and strength. His stubbornness is normally unyielding except where one finds access to his heart. Hateful when insulted, 'Aflaq's demeanor gives an impression of laziness though he has had a full active life. In a very real sense 'the party was an expression of his humanity and reflected from its early days his talents and his weaknesses '.3 'Aflaq took the idea of the Ba'& and fashioned a political philosophy out of it. But he was temperamentally reluctant or unwilling to enter politics. 'Our task', he wrote in 1943, 'is to open the road for the new generation, not to pave it; to raise thorns, not to plant roses; to sow the eternal seeds, not to reap the ripe fruits. Because of this we will not partake in government, and shall remain in the path of struggle for a long time. '4 This view was widely accepted by the rank and file of the party for a long time. Some prominent members even thought that political activity would only contaminate the Ba'&. It was not until the party began its close association with Akram al-Haurbni that this outlook was discarded. Haurini ultimately performed on the BaL& what Lenin performed on Marxism: he changed it into a strategy of political action.
P R A G M A T I C P O L I T I C A L O R I E N T A T I O N A N D L E A D E R S H I P : A K R A M AL-HAURANI
A restless and pertinacious activist, Akram al-Haurbni was born in Hama, before 1958 a traditional city controlled by powerful landowning families, Al-Jundi, p. 34. Ibid.p.45.
notably the 'Azms, Kaylinis and Barizis. From youth he shared with the Ba'aists that forceful nationalism mixed with genuine concern for the plight of the masses, especially the peasants, which made him an unregenerate foe of the landowners. After acquiring his law degree from the Syrian university, Haurdni plunged headlong into a desperate struggle to emancipate the peasants in the muhkfaza of Hama from the shackles of feudal control. From the very beginning his career was marked by a type of personal courage which reflected an indomitable will. But he was undisciplined, concerned more with power and success, less with principle.' As a result, he often unwittingly sacrificed the latter for the former. In 1936 Haurdni joined the militant Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP), only to withdraw from it disenchanted two years later.2 It was a brief association, though probably more significant than has thus far been realized. The SSNP was the first political organization that made a conscious effort to infiltrate the army by wooing sympathetic officers and sending full-fledged members to the military academy in Homs.3 T o what extent Haurdni was privy to, and benefited from, the SSNP's links in the army cannot be ascertained. But the experience was no doubt of value. In the years to follow, Haurini was never too far afield whenever military officers played politics. In Hama, Haurini was first a member and eventually leader of al-ahabkb party,=+ a small grouping of youth which served as a springboard for his meteoric career.5 The articles which Haurini contributed to the party's weekly, al-Yaq&a, demonstrate an aptitude for writing that is a perfect complement to his brilliant oratory. Members of al-sabkb looked up to him as an intellectual leader,6 a fact obscured by his well-known propensity for action. When Ra&d 'Ali al-Kaylini raised the banner of revolt in Iraq, Haurini was the first among a group of enthusiastic volunteers to rush to his aid.7 On the way back to Syria, Haurdni and company were momentarily detained in Deir al-ZQr by the French. Among the detainees were Jamil al-Atdsi, 'Afif al-Bizrig and perhaps 'Adndn al-Milki,9 all of whom were friends of the Ba'& and destined to play important r6les in the subsequent military and political affairs of the country. The whole episode enhanced Haurini's influence with the army officers and foreshadowed his partnership with the Ba'a. During the 1943 elections Haurbni had no compunction against working with traditional elements' to win the parliamentary seat he was to retain until 1958.
As an ambitious representative of the young generation in Hama, he soon earned a reputation for aggressiveness which made him a striking exception in a chamber otherwise known for its subservience to president Quwatli and his National Bloc.2 His views and speeches in parliament echoed the ideas expounded by al-Ihya"' al-'Arabi. When Salbh al-Bitbr was arrested, Haurdni was the only deputy found willing to defend him and ask for his release.3 This sort of spirited and largely spontaneous co-operation between Haurbni, 'Aflaq and Bitbr4 was accompanied by a growing rapprochement between their respective followers, who discovered that their goals were similar if not identical.5 The nexus thus formed between the two leftist factions was further cemented during the armed struggle against the French in 1945. In Damascus, al-lhya"' organized its members into units called Firaq al-Jihdd al-Watani (units of national struggle),6 and enjoined patriotic officers to rebel against the French-led Troupes Spiciales.7 In Hama, Haurbni, along with a number of zealous young officers, took part in a guerrilla movement, and managed to chase the French garrison from its stronghold in the city's citadel.8 The fighting did not subside until the British Eighth Army intervened, and the bitter struggle against the hated Mandate finally came to an end when the French, however grudgingly, evacuated the country.
I V . S Y R I A N P R A E T O R I A N I S M A N D T H E R I S E O F A R S P
Syria after independence was a good example of a praetorian society in an oligarchic phase.9 The traditionalist leaders presided over groupings rather than political parties. Such were the National Bloc of S u k r i al-Quwatli, the National party (al-Hixb al-Watani) of Sabri al-'Asali, and the larger People's party (Hizb al-SJza'b) of Ru&di al-Kfkhya and Nbzim al-Qudsi-agglomorations of prominent individuals who had fought the French with tenacity and commendable Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 40. His co-operation in 1943 with affiliates of the National Bloc was probably unavoidable if he was to succeed. Elections to the Syrian parliament at the time entailed certain steps: each IOO voters chose a representative, and the chosen representatives elected delegates to parliament. It was thus relatively easy for landowners and traditionalist forces to influence voters and manipulate the polls. Besides, the power and popularity of the National Bloc was such that hardly anyone could hope to win the elections without its support or tacit approval. Not until 1947,and owing to public demonstrations instigated in part by the Ba'b, were direct one-step election procedures instituted. Al-Jundi, Al-Ba'th, p. 44. endurance, but emerged after independence largely shapeless and disorganized, squabbling for the fruits of office instead of grappling with the forces of backwardness manifest in the seemingly eternal curses of disease, ignorance and poverty. But they were solidly entrenched, controlling the country economically and dominating it politically. Their failure to measure up to the task of national reconstruction made 'Aflaq's proposed Inqildb all the more urgent; their power prevented it. It was precisely this kind of paradoxical impasse that hastened the politicization of Syria by driving the frustrated intellectuals and educated youth to seek solutions to a post-independence condition which to them appeared stagnant or even atrophied.
A grass-root change in the political complexion of the country was in the long run unavoidable. That the process started so soon after independence and took a turbulent, extra-legal form was one of the more crucial by-products of the first Arab-Israeli war. Before 1948 the traditionalists, despite their omissions and commissions, wielded supremacy and enjoyed considerable popularity. After 1948 they suddenly found themselves face to face with something tantamount to political bankruptcy.' In Syria, more than any other country in the Arab Middle East, 1948marked a watershed; it disgraced the pro-western liberal-conservatives, and activated a leftist movement as a feasible alternati~e.~ Of the leftist forces, the B a ' b of 'Aflaq and Bitir, and al-S'Jzabdb of Haurini were the most ideally suited, by virtue of their intense nationalism, to spearhead an attack against the traditionalists. The Communist Party was superbly organized and very ably led by U i l i d Bakdih, but until 1954 it was illegal3 and its popular appeal was severely circumscribed by its slavish adherence to MarxistLeninist dogma. T o the Syrian communists the issue of Arab nationalism was not considered ' . . . as a desirable end in itself, but merely as aid toward creating the necessary conditions for the successful application of socialism'.4 To the Ba'aists as well as to Haurini, on the other hand, the application of socialism was requisite for the emancipation of the people from the economicpolitical hegemony of the traditionalists and a precondition for the regeneration of the entire Arab nation. Socialism was embraced as the only reliable vehicle for 'Aflaq's Inqilib.
From the outset Haurani was the outstanding political figure of the radical left. His leading r6le derived from two separate, albeit related, spheres: his immense popularity among the peasants in the muhdfaxa of Hama and his extensive influence over youthful nationalistic officers in the army.
The relentless efforts of al-S'Jzabdb on behalf of the peasant accompanied by an assault on the power and prestige of the leading landowning families gave Haurini an unshakable political base in the rural district, but not as much in the city proper, of Hama.' So great was his success in the area that the peasants there were known to be loyal to him per se and not to any program of socialism or land distribution. Indeed, it was only after his prestige soared among the Hama peasantry in the 1950s that the communists, drawn by the example, moved to capture the allegiance of all the Syrian peasantsz though with much less impressive results.
Awakening the Hama peasantry and starting a veritable class struggle in the region, however, was scarcely sufficient to impair the power of the traditionalists over the country at large. In a centralized state such as Syria, what matters in the final analysis is control at the top, the seat of government in Damascus. But to socio-political rebels such as the Ba'thists and members of al-Babdb were in 1948, this was constitutionally unobtainable. The traditionalists had originally gained power on the strength of their social status and economic wealth. Once firmly established, they harnessed the machinery of the state to preserve and augment their vested interests. Legalism and Clitism in effect merged to perpetuate traditional control. If such a vicious circle were to be broken, extra-legal action was imperative. Against this background, Haurani's links with the army assumed crucial significance. Throughout the forties, the young leader from Hama had been silently establishing contacts with admiring army officers. When the Palestinian war erupted in 1948, he fought side by side with military and civilian irregulars under the general command of Fawzi al-Qawiqji.3 At the close of hostilities, Haurani emerged as the acknowledged parliamentary spokesman of the army.4
The Quwatli rkgime, having agreed to armistice negotiations, was feeling the tremors of the defeat in Palestine. There were demonstrations in Latakia,s and the army was in a sullen and rebellious mood. Instead of treading warily, the government further embroiled the situation by injudiciously announcing a cut in the defence budget-a none too subtle move to let the army shoulder the responsibility for the Palestinian fiasco.6 The response of the military was prompt and conclusive. On 30 March 1949, Colonel Husni al-Za'im, in a swift and bloodless coup d'e'tat, seized power and toppled Quwatli. Za'im's action was neither inspired by a conflict in ideology nor actuated by any kind of class struggle. The military reformers were interested simply in a house-cleaning operation that would strengthen the Syrian state and put an end to the corruption of the ousted rCgime.7 But for the future political development of Syria, the event had far- reaching connotations. It dealt a major blow to the constitutional legitimacy of traditionalist control; it awakened the emerging leftist forces to the decisiveness of the army as an instrument of politics; and, equally important, it unmistakably revealed the disorganization and frailty of the traditionalists. As a result, the coup of 1949, instead of marking the beginning of construction and reform, heralded a chain of coup d'e'tats in rapid succession. Participation in politics was no longer limited to the Clite groups, but expanded to include elements from the amorphous Syrian bourgeoisie.' Syrian praetorianism was passing from an oligarchical to a middle class-radical phase. In such a polity, social solidarity is extremely weak and political strife much more intense.2
HaurAni and his officer clique along with other Ba'thists played a conspicuous rale in preparing and staging the March coup.3 Their intrigue was the product of sheer expediency, since the principal objective was the overthrow of Quwatli rather than the support of Za'im. When the latter's increasing despotism and erratic policies proved equally injurious to them as to their adversaries, they turned against him and joined Colonel SAmi al-HinnPwi in engineering yet another coup on 14 August 1949. Za'im and his prime minister Muhsin al-Barizi were summarily executed and the venerable HAhim al-AtAsi became president of the republic. m a l i d al-'Azm was re-appointed prime minister, and a mixed cabinet including HaurPni and R u h d i al-I<i&a, leader of the People's party, was formed.4 A semblance of normalcy was presumably restored.
But appearances were deceptive. In the context of Arab politics, there was a veritable race between the Saudi monarchy and the Hashemites of Iraq for the control of Syria. The traditionalist People's party was the main proponent of a Syrian-Iraqi union and the eventual formation of a Fertile Crescent Arab state. Strangely enough, 'Aflaq's party was initially inclined to support such a move.5 But HaurAni had very different ideas. So long as the royal house of HPshim endured, Syria could not join Iraq in any union without forfeiting her republican character, a prospect which the Syrian military and HaurAni found intolerable. So when the elections of 1949 gave an impressive return to the People's party, HaurAni not only pressured the Ba'aists to retract their endorsement of the suggested Syrc+Iraqi union-an indication that he was already gaining ascendancy over them-but simultaneously turned to scheming with his old associate, Colonel Adib al-Shishakli,6 who managed to dislodge Hinniwi in the third coup I Huntington, Political Order, p. 202.
Ibid. pp. 198-208. 3 Ahmad I. al-Fil, Sziriyyii al-Ja&& Fi al-If.qilibain al-Awwal wa al-Biini (Damascus, 1949) --Shishakli was not, as many had mistakenly assumed, a mere follower of Haurhni, but a man of strong character and very definite ambitions. At first he preferred to work from behind the scenes through Haurhni. The latter became minister of defence and head of a parliamentary republican bloc which he pieced together as a counter-weight to the People's party.3 But in December I 9 5 2 Shishakli felt strong enough to dissolve parliament and assume dictatorial powers.4 He then openly turned against his erstwhile leftist allies by ordering the suppression of all political parties and organizing his own Arab Liberation Movement (Harakat al-Tahrir al-'Arabi).s The communists responded by accusing Shishakli's 'accursed fascist military dictatorship' of collaboration with imperialism.6 Haurani's opposition7 characteristically took the form of a coup attempted unsuccessfully by his friends 'Abd al-mani Qanniit and 'Adnhn al-Mhlki.8 The conspirators were jai1ed;g and Haurhni along with 'Aflaq and Bithr, after a brief detention, made good their flight across the mountains to Beirut, and later to Rome.
The most significant outcome of the entire episode was the official merger of 'Aflaq's Ba'& with Haurhni's Arab Socialist party10 to form the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party (ARSP)." Influential members from both parties had been 7 Quite apart from an obvious clash between two domineering personalities, the falling out between Haurhni and &i&akli was precipitated by the former's insistence on land distribution, an issue which &i&akli never took seriously.
8 S a l h a , Al-Ba'g, p. 7 .
9 An unknown number of high-ranking officers were also dismissed from the army (Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 353). On his arrival in Lebanon, Haurhni accused &i&akli of arresting seventy-six officers and 'selling-out ' to western imperialism (Torrey, Syrian
Politics, p. 2 I 8).
I0 The old name al-Shabcib was discarded in 1950.
" The merger presumably took place in January 1953 (Torrey, Syrian Politics, p. 218;
and Salhma, Al-Ba'g, p. 7).
advocating such a merger and co-ordination of political strategies, but 'Aflaq's reluctance had always been a stumbling-block.' Under the shadow of Shishakli's dictatorship, however, the advantage of forming a united front against a hostile rCgime and traditionalist opponents, especially the People's party,2 was too alluring even for the cautious 'Aflaq. The union, therefore, was essentially a marriage of convenience consummated under the pressure of unusual events. Since the Ba'th had a relatively robust structure,3 and a ready-made ideology applicable to the aspirations of both parties, there was no real need to change much of anything save for the name. A general amnesty granted by Shishakli in October 1953 allowed the exiled Ba'tljst leaders a safe return to Syria. But no sooner did they arrive in Damascus than Haurbni resumed his clandestine activities to overthrow Shishakli. Tactically, he employed the Arab proverb 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. It was Haur2ni who played a central r61e in bringing together such strange bedfellows as the ARSP, the People's party, and the National party to form the Homs pact which was designed to rid the country of Shishakli.4 Among students and workers, Ba'aist agitation was such that an article concerning a plajr performed in the American Aleppo college triggered serious demonstrations in Aleppo and Damascus.5 Anti-Shishakli leaflets were distributed by the Ba'th in the restive Jabal al-Driiz region and touched off a chain of action-reaction events which ended in bloodshed.6 All these developments kept Shishakli preoccupied and off balance while silent conspiracies were being hatched inside the army for his ouster. The People's party was intriguing with sympathetic officers such as Faysal at-At2si and 'Umar &An to secure a coup d'e'tat and unite Syria with Iraq. But the ARSP was a few steps ahead of them. During the night of 27-28 February, Mustafa Hamdiin, one of Haurbni's most intimate friends, supported by his aide Muhammad 'Amrbn, rebelled with the Aleppo garrison. In response, BaC&ist officers in Dar'a and Jabal al-Driiz arrested their superiors and threatened to march on Damascus unless Shishakli left the country.' Faced with imminent civil war, Shishakli found prudence the better part of valor, and fled to exile.
V. B A ' T H I S T A S C E N D E N C Y -
The ARSP was obviously the major beneficiary of Shishakli's downfall. Its Sallma, Al-Ba'& p. 7 .
2 'Aflaq later indicated that he and H a u r h i decided to join forces in order to effectively meet the threat of the People's party. The results of these elections suggest several important points. First, the party system governed the elections.3 Secondly, although the majority of eligible voters cast their ballots according to party affiliations, the number of elected independents remained surprisingly high, a clear indication that the Syrian electorate was still responsive to the socially prominent personality. Thirdly, the rising tide of the leftist forces, evidenced by the substantial growth of ARSP and the election of the first communist (&%lid BakdA&) to an Arab parliament, had eroded the political influence of the traditionalists more than their popular base. The People's party and the National party, together with traditional independents, still held a majority of seats. But Syria, traditional at heart, was being radicalized by a determined leftist minority.
In 1954 an incident occurred which reflected a qualified change in HaurAni's political strategy. When the People's party manoeuvered to weaken the ARSP by arranging the transfer of Mustafa HamdQn to Egypt, his fellow Ba'lhist officers momentarily met in the home of 'Abd a l -a a n i QannQt and decided on a coup d'e'tat to topple the rdgime. But HaurAni overruled their impulsiveness, and HamdQn carried out his orders and joined the military academy in Cairo.4 Evidently, the ARSP's bitter experience with Za'im, HinnAwi and Shishakli had I Ousted Ba'hist officers such as al-MPlki and QannQt were immediately reinstated and given sensitive commands, and a partial purge of anti-ARSP officers was carried out. Salfima, Al-Ba'th, p. 9.
Al-Haycit (Beirut), 7 October 1954. Out of the sixteen ARSP seats, five were carried by Haurhi's list in the muhcifaza of Hama, where the entire list of traditionalist 'Abd al-RahmPn al-'Azm was defeated. In contrast, BitPr, in spite of HaurPni's support, was barely elected in Damascus. Apart from their success in converting students, the Ba'aists failed to acquire a mass following in Damascus, where a substantial bourgeois class with a predominantly traditional outlook remained unaffected by Ba'thist propaganda. For a revealing analysis of Damascus, its society and the failure of ARSP in understanding it, see Al-Jundi, Al-Ba'th, pp. 38-39. 3 Al-Hay& (Beirut), 6 October 1954.
served as an object lesson on the dangerous unreliability of the soldier turned politician. Thereafter, Haurdni used his power with the army to harry political opponents, but discouraged the Ba'aist military from acting openly against the established government. In a way, there was no other alternative. Although the party was strong enough to flout the constitutional process by coercion, it was still too weak to overthrow it. Haurilni thus vetoed direct military action. He then turned his considerable talents to the arduous task of controlling the parliamentary apparatus of the Syrian state. Existing political conditions and the nature of the new chamber played into Haurdni's hands. On I 5 October, Ndzim al-Qudsi, deputy leader of the People's party, was elected speaker of the chamber. But efforts to formulate a national government foundered amidst general disagreement:
( I ) Although the ARSP had no desire to enter the cabinet, it agreed to support an independent for the premiership (pointing to B d l i d al-'Azm), provided his cabinet was in harmony with 'national interests'.
(2) The People's party, while opposing any cabinet composed purely of independents, endorsed any other ministry which could command a parliamentary majority.
(3) The National party came against any coalition government that did not include the ARSP (an attempt to saddle the Ba'aists with governmental responsibility).
(4) The independents were divided, though they insisted on the premiership going to one from their ranks.= This sort of bickering frequently resulted in crisis-ridden situations which put an added strain on Syria's fledgling democracy. ARSP tactics did not create such divisiveness; they merely aggravated and used it. It was the inability of the traditionalists to close ranks and concert their efforts that made them so vulnerable to the unsavory methods employed by Haurilni in his drive for the political mastery of the country.
After three successive coup d'e'tats, the demonstrated power of the ARSP with the military was always on the minds of the intimidated traditional politicians. They had little doubt that HaurAni would use this power. In the unlikely event that the officer cliques of the Ba'th were neutralized by traditionalist officers or by unforeseen developments in the army, the ARSP could fall back on its ability to stage strikes and demonstrations whenever party interests called for such actions. This ability stemmed from the remarkable success of the BaC&ist leaders in winning wide support among notoriously volatile students and workers.2 The repercussions of Ba'aist-instigated street and civil disturbances on the govern- ment were not inconsiderable. I n a way, this was a form of political arm-twisting that was utilized on numerous occasions to keep the government as well as the ARSP antagonists harassed and demoralized. There was also a very effective propaganda campaign calculated to indoctrinate the masses with the Ba'thist ideology and prepare them for the ultimate Inqikdb. Aside from writing books and pamphlets and delivering public speeches, Ba'tijst leaders prepared and circulated hundreds of publications to party members and sympathisers. In addition, there was the official daily of the party, al-Ba'th, which, despite its irregular appearance, acted as a sounding voice of the ARSP and kept supporters informed of the party's standing with regard to each specific political issue. All these activities helped widen the popular base of the Ba'& by extending its appeal and communicating its principles to interested literate Arabs.
The ARSP was not long in demonstrating its power. On 22 April 1955 Colonel 'Adrian al-Millki,' deputy to the chief of staff, was assassinated in the Damascus municipal stadium by YQnis 'Abd al-Rahfm,= a member of the Syrian Socialist National party.3 The BaC&ists reacted by launching an intensive hate-campaign which reached hysterical proportions. SSNP leaders were hunted down by the authorities. Several demonstrations swept Damascus, and an angry mob sacked and burned the victimized party's official paper, al-Bind'. There followed a series of treason trials in which the SSNP was dissolved and most of its leaders given stiff prison sentences.+ For all practical purposes, the SSNP was liquidated as a political force in Syria. I n the process, the Ba'& lost an important military figure, but pulverized a potentially dangerous enemy.
In parliament Haurilni was working to discredit the traditional parties and push through the ARSP's program of land reform. His actions had a schematic pattern which was largely opportunistic, occasionally demagogic, but always characterized by deftness and political acumen. T o strengthen the leftist forces vis-d-vis the traditionalists, he entered a working alliance with the communists, -who had emerged after 1954as the best-organized political party in the country.5 When traditionalist deputies defeated his proposal for land distribution, Haur3ni resorted to pressure and intimidation. In June, the sixteen BaC&ist deputies threatened to resign and 'return to the ranks of the people in order to work for emancipation from feudalism and the liberation of state property'.6 The threat was not carried out, but thirteen Ba'thists asked the speaker of the chamber to investigate a charge of bribery levelled against several traditionalist deputies.
His brother RiyPd al-MPlki was a prominent BaC&ist leader.
* He was a sergeant in the Syrian army. After assassinating al-MPlki he committed suicide on the spot. HaurAni himself took the stand to accuse certain M.P.s of accepting bribery as a reward for defeating land reform.' These manoeuvers were not always successful, but they kept the traditionalists on the defensive and popularized the Ba'h as the aggressive champion of the toiling masses. In addition, traditionalist deputies co-operated negatively in resisting land reform, since they were unable to work together effectively in containing the ARSP and its allies. Party strife became so severe that a national pact endorsed by all factions loomed as the only sensible remedy. On 17 February 1956, representatives from all parties met to formulate a program acceptable to a majority in parliament.
On the same morning the ARSP issued a declaration which stressed the urgent need for a new powerful government that could extend the dual pact with Egypt to encompass political, economic and military relations.2 The following day HaurAni publicly announced that his party had long been insisting on a national pact which would make possible the formation of a cabinet capable of marshalling 'the material and spiritual forces of the country'.3 The purpose of these pronouncements was twofold: to bring down the traditional government of Sa'id al-GJazzi,4 and undermine the pro-Iraqi People's party by tying Syria ever more closely to Egypt. The degree of HaurQni's success was clearly indicated by the similarity between the national pact, completed on 8 March5 and the ARSP program.
The national pact notwithstanding, attempts to form a new government snarled. The ARSP was apparently willing to join a cabinet headed by a populist, and including representatives of all major parties.6 The People and National parties, on the other hand, wanted to exclude the ARSP from any government.' The outcome was a dangerous deadlock which even the intervention of president Quwatli could not resolve. Haurlni invoked the power of the mob to browbeat his adversaries. On 3 June, a violent Ba'thist demonstration broke into the ministry of defence and practically forced the resignation of al-Dazzi's government.' The traditionalist -parties tried once again to bypass the ARSP and form a semi-national cabinet under the premiership of Lutfi al-Hafflr, but stern opposition from the leftist elements in parliament barred their way. Al-Haffar stepped down, and president Quwatli entrusted Sabri al-'Asali with the task of forming a 'national unity' coalition. Significantly, al-'Asali succeeded in his consultations only after he allocated two sensitive portfolios to the Ba'th: Salah al-Bitlr became foreign minister, and =all1 Kallh went to the department of national ecoi~omy.~ The new cabinet adopted the national pact as a political platform, and won an overwhelming vote of confidence from parliament.3 Flushed with its victory, the ARSP pressured al-'Asali to open formal negotiations with Egypt and lay down a blueprint for an eventual federation of the two countries." A three-man delegation consisting of al-'Asali himself (National party), Ahmad Qanbar (People's party) and Bitlr (ARSP) was actually selected5 to negotiate with Egyptian officials, but Gamll 'Abd al-Nhir's nationalization of the Suez Canal and the resultant international crisis caused the entire scheme to be laid aside. The Suez war and its immediate aftermath, while postponing unity between Syria and Egypt, sealed the fate of the traditional pro-Iraqi People's party, the largest and most formidable opponent of ARSP. 'Abd al-Nlsir's popularity among the Arabs was rising at a phenomenal rate, whereas the Hashemites of Iraq, especially their perennial prime minister, Niiri al-Sa'id, were generally looked upon as western lackeys working to frustrate Arab nationalism. It was even rumored that camouflaged British planes had attacked Egypt from the Habblniyyah base near Ba&dad. The People's party, already suffering from the onus of supporting feudalism, now was suspected of treasonous collaboration with Iraq. once again the stage was set for another ARSP spectacular. Late in 1956, Iraq was openly accused of plotting with reactionary elements against the national interests of Syria. The ARSP swiftly mustered the support of a a l i d al-'Azm with a battery of independents and moved to implicate many influential populists and conservatives who were quickly brought to trial and convicted.6 I Al-Hayit (Beirut) Although he came from a prominent traditionalist family and owned large tracts of land and many buildings, al-'Azm did not hesitate in siding with the leftist forces against fellow traditionalists. His ultimate purpose was presumably the presidency, which he was known to covet very strongly. Since any opposition to the rising tide of leftist nationalist sentiment would have been fatal to his political career, he apparently elected to ride the crest of the wave instead of being swamped by it. Al-'Azm's career is a tragic testimony to the disunity and failure of the Syrian traditionalists.
between Syria and NATO-member Turkey. Ankara massed troops along her southern border; Damascus accused Turkey of harboring malignant intentions and advanced a complaint to the United Nations. Egypt, in an unusual gesture of solidarity with Syria, dispatched 3000 troops to Latakia. The symbolic Egyptian force was presumably moved to the Turkish border, and its arrival was hailed by Haurdni as a historical event.'
In the end, nothing came from the Syrian-Turkish hostility. But a month later, an Egyptian parliamentary delegation (40 members), sitting in joint session with the Syrian parliament, voted with the majority of Syrian deputies for a federal union between Syria and E g y~t .~
On I February 1958 the United Arab Republic was proclaimed after a ceremonial meeting of Egyptian and Syrian officials at the Qubba palace in Cairo. On 5 February, the proclamation was ratified by the Egyptian and Syrian parliaments, the sole dissenting vote being that of the communist leader, a d l i d Bakdd&.
From the Ba'hist point of view, the union with Egypt represented the fulfilment of an ideal and a solution to a very dangerous situation. By the fall of 1957, the tactical alliance between the communists and ARSP had crumbled. From the very beginning 'Aflaq was vehemently opposed to any form of co-operation with communism,3 while Haurdni enlisted B a k d d s s support against the traditionalists. When the People's party was publicly discredited and politically disarmed, the common threat that had brought the leftist partners together no longer existed. Recrimination, leading to open rivalry, inexorably followed. The organs of Ba'hist propaganda inveighed against the communists;4 Bitdr and Haurdni labeled them 'alien' and 'insignificant ' . 5 The Ba'thist diatribe, however, was insufficient to damage the Communist Party, astutely led by BakdP& and enjoying unqualified support from Moscow. Since the outcome of a showdown with the communists was uncertain, and the possibility of a communist coup d'ktat not altogether ruled out, the ARSP opted for security in immediate unification with Egypt. Of equal significance was the soaring popularity of Ndsir and the rising cult of his charismatic leadership. If Haurlni and 'Aflaq could not implement the party program, N b i r certainly possessed the stature, magnetism and, seemingly, the drive and determination to do so. Unity with Egypt was thus envisaged as a ceremony of marriage between Ba'hist ideology and Nbir's dynamic leadership, which would inevitably put the Arab nation in the path of unity, freedom and socialism. In 1952 the membership of the Ba'th party did not exceed 500. By 1954 the number had swelled to over 25oo~--still far too small to carry much political weight or prepare the people for the Inqildb. Yet scarcely three years later the ARSP managed to unite Syria with Egypt. It was a tremendous achievement worthy of a party that had arrogated to itself the rBle of ideological leadership of the entire Arab world. But the amalgamated nature of the ARSP, the ruthlessness with which it gained power, and the fundamental differences, often antagonisms, which plagued its leadership, all militated to disrupt the party despite its success.
The Ba'aist dogma is extremely vague. It preaches rebellion against sociopolitical decadence, but does not analyse the nature of the rejected decadent society. It advocates socialism without setting up a real program of social action. It promises a kind of freedom that is elevating to the spirit, but fanciful beyond attainment. And the unity it calls for is wrapped in a thick mantle of romanticism. Ba'thism, therefore, is readily susceptible to individual interpretations. Its emphasis is on revolution, not political construction.
When 'Aflaq, Bitiir, and Haurfini joined together in adversity to form ARSP, they gave little thought to the long-range implications of their action. If the goals were the same, the means employed for their achievement could be regulated, or so, one might infer, was the assumption. The merger of the two parties was more in the nature of a federal, rather than an organic, union. Each leader retained his separate following and own conception of what the party was or ought to be, and what should be done to further its aims.2 'Aflaq's fervid panArabism led him to concentrate on spreading the Ba'thist gospel in other Arab states such as Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. HaurPni rarely worked outside the borders of Syria. 'Aflaq found the alliance with the communists repugnant, and wanted to keep the party limited to a dedicated corps of al-Tali'a fighters. But Haurfini saw power and expediency in temporarily working with the communists, and insisted on enlarging the membership of the party to make it a genuine mass movement. On matters of doctrinal interpretation, the two leaders were equally separated. For example, 'Aflaq looked upon private property as a 'sacred right', whereas Haurgni took the utilitarian view that it is nothing more than a 'social function that should be adapted for the public good.3 There seldom have been two party leaders with such completely opposite personalities and antithetical conceptions of political strategy.
This sort of divided leadership acted disastrously on a party with such a strong paternalistic tradition. 'Aflaq, Bitiir and Haurfini were affectionately and respectfully referred to by party members as the 'three professors'. They not only Al-Jundi, Al-BUM,p. 36. Although more pragmatic and precise than 'Aflaq, Bitlr nevertheless was in relative agreement with his life-long friend, and together they constituted a separate wing in the Baithist leadership that was quite distinct from that of Haurhi. mapped party strategy, but also 'instructed' their followers. So when the leaders fell to haggling with each other, they created bewilderment and confusion within the party. Central direction quickly was abandoned, and factions clustered around individual persona1ities.I Fundamental disagreements were ultimately settled, not by democratic consensus or arbitration, but by the degree of power a leader could muster. Since HaurPni predominated over the Baithist military, he normally held the upper hand, and remained unquestionably the strongman of the ARSP to 1958. 'Aflaq and BitPr wavered between objection and passive opposition, but they never dared to challenge HaurPni openly.2
HaurPni's de facto predominance over the party was a negation of the Ba'aist principle of collective leadership supported by the masses. More serious still was the impact of his machinations on the largely undefined, though critical, relationship between the civilian and military branches of the party. Civilian control was never openly challenged or contested, yet was fatally weakened by divisiveness. Faced with the 'Aflaq-HaurPni struggle, the Ba'lhist officers were initially driven to take sides, and eventually ended by taking over. HaurPni therefore was, perhaps inadvertently, fostering praetorianism instead of working for the Inqildb. In the 1950s he was able to continue to keep the military in line by sheer force of character, but by 1957 his leadership was already being questioned. After the Qatana mutiny a series of confrontations occurred between the Ba'& civilian and military leaders which revealed increasingly profound personal and ideological differences.3
An inevitable concomitant of all this was the progressive internal atomization of the party accompanied by an erosion of its moral and ideological discipline. The Bai&ist raison d'ktre was gradually but irretrievably lost and radical praetorianism was ushered in. These were the seeds that were sown in the 1950s, germinated in the 1960s and left in full bloom today.
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Abu Jaber attributes this outcome to 'Aflaq's inability or unwillingness to assume responsibility. (The Arab Ba't&, p. 14. But see 'Amrsn, Tajribatf, vol. I, p. 14. ) * This was clearly demonstrated by the crisis inside the party in July 1957 over the issue of the Communist alliance.
